On the Price of Anarchy for High-Price Links by Àlvarez, Carme & Messegué, Arnau
On the Price of Anarchy for High-Price Links
C. A`lvarez and A. Messegue´
ALBCOM Research Group, Computer Science Department, UPC, Barcelona
{alvarez,amessegue}@cs.upc.edu
Abstract. We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network
Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker in 2003.
This is a selfish network creation model where players correspond to nodes in a network and each
of them can create links to the other n− 1 players at a prefixed price α > 0. The player’s goal is
to minimise the sum of her cost buying edges and her cost for using the resulting network. One
of the main conjectures for this model states that the price of anarchy, i.e. the relative cost of the
lack of coordination, is constant for all α. This conjecture has been confirmed for α = O(n1−δ)
with δ ≥ 1/ logn and for α > 4n− 13. The best known upper bound on the price of anarchy for
the remaining range is 2O(
√
logn).
We give new insights into the structure of the Nash equilibria for α > n and we enlarge the range
of the parameter α for which the price of anarchy is constant. Specifically, we prove that for any
small  > 0, the price of anarchy is constant for α > n(1 + ) by showing that any biconnected
component of any non-trivial Nash equilibrium, if it exists, has at most a constant number of
nodes.
1 Introduction
Many distinct network creation models trying to capture properties of Internet-like networks or social
networks have been extensively studied in Computer Science, Economics, and Social Sciences. In these
models, the players (also called nodes or agents) buy some links to other players creating in this way a
network formed by their choices. Each player has a cost function that captures the need of buying few
links and, at the same time, being well-connected to all the remaining nodes of the resulting network.
The aim of each player is to minimise her cost following her selfish interests. A stable configuration
in which every player or agent has no incentive in deviating unilaterally from her current strategy is
called a Nash equilibrium (ne). In order to evaluate the social impact of the resulting network, the
social cost is introduced. In this setting the social cost is defined as the sum of the individual costs of
all the players. Since there is no coordination among the different players, one can expect that stable
networks do not minimise the social cost. The price of anarchy (PoA) is a measure that quantifies
how far is the worst ne (in the sense of social cost) with respect to any optimal configuration that
minimises the social cost. Specifically, the PoA is defined as the ratio between the maximum social
cost of ne and the social cost of the optimal configuration. If we were able to prove formally that the
PoA is constant, then we could conclude that the equilibrium configurations in the selfish network
creation games are so good in terms of social cost.
Since the introduction of the classical network creation game by Fabrikant et al. in [12], many efforts
have been done in order to analyze the quality of the resulting equilibrium networks. The constant PoA
conjecture is a well-known conjecture that states that the PoA is constant independently of the price
of the links. In this work we provide a new understanding of the structure of the equilibrium networks
for the classical network creation game [12]. We focus on the equilibria for high-price links and show
that in the case that an equilibrium is not a tree, then the size of any of its biconnected components is
upper bounded by a constant. This is the key ingredient to prove later that, for any small  > 0, the
PoA is constant for α > n(1 + ) where α is the price per link and n is the number of nodes.
Let us first define formally the model and related concepts.
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1.1 Model and definitions
The sum classic network creation game Γ is defined by a pair Γ = (V, α) where V = {1, 2, ...., n}
denotes the set of players and α > 0 a positive parameter. Each player u ∈ V represents a node of an
undirected graph and α represents the cost of establishing a link.
A strategy of a player u of Γ is a subset su ⊆ V \ {u}, the set of nodes for which player u
pays for establishing a link. A strategy profile for Γ is a tuple s = (s1, . . . , sn) where su is the
strategy of player u, for each player u ∈ V . Let S be the set of all strategy profiles of Γ . Every
strategy profile s has associated a communication network that is defined as the undirected graph
G[s] = (V, {uv | v ∈ su ∨ u ∈ sv}). Notice that uv denotes the undirected edge between u and v.
Let dG(u, v) be the distance in G between u and v. The cost associated to a player u ∈ V in a
strategy profile s is defined by cu(s) = α|su|+DG[s](u) where DG(u) =
∑
v∈V,v 6=u dG(u, v) is the sum
of the distances from the player u to all the other players in G. As usual, the social cost of a strategy
profile s is defined by C(s) =
∑
u∈V cu(s).
A Nash Equilibrium (ne) is a strategy vector s such that for every player u and every strategy
vector s′ differing from s in only the u component, su 6= s′u, satisfies cu(s) ≤ cu(s′). In a ne s no player
has incentive to deviate individually her strategy since the cost difference cu(s
′)− cu(s) ≥ 0. Finally,
let us denote by E the set of all ne strategy profiles. The price of anarchy (PoA) of Γ is defined as
PoA = maxs∈E C(s)/mins∈S C(s).
It is worth observing that in a ne s = (s1, ..., sn) it never happens that u ∈ sv and v ∈ su, for any
u, v ∈ V . Thus, if s is a ne, s can be seen as an orientation of the edges of G[s] where an arc from u to
v is placed whenever v ∈ su. It is clear that a ne s induces a graph G[s] that we call NE graph and we
mostly omit the reference to such strategy profile s when it is clear from context. However, notice that
a graph G can have different orientations. Hence, when we say that G is a ne graph we mean that G
is the outcome of a ne strategy profile s, that is, G = G[s].
Given a graph G we denote by X ⊆ G the subgraph of G induced by V (X). In this way, given a
graph G = G[s] = (V,E), a node v ∈ V , and X ⊆ G, the outdegree of v in X is defined as deg+X(v) =
| {u ∈ V (X) | u ∈ sv} |, the indegree of v in X as deg−X(v) = | {u ∈ V (X) | v ∈ su} |, and, finally, the
degree of v in X as degX(v) = deg
+
X(v) + deg
−
X(v). Notice that degX(v) = | {u ∈ V (X) | uv ∈ E} |.
Furthermore, the average degree of X is defined as deg(X) =
∑
v∈V (X) degX(v)/|V (X)|.
Furthermore, remind that in a connected graph G = (V,E) a vertex is a cut vertex if its removal
increases the number of connected components of G. A graph is biconnected if it has no cut vertices.
We say that H ⊆ G is a biconnected component of G if H is a maximal biconnected subgraph of G.
More specifically, H is such that there is no other distinct biconnected subgraph of G containing H
as a subgraph. Given a biconnected component H of G and a node u ∈ V (H), we define S(u) as
the connected component containing u in the subgraph induced by the vertices (V (G) \ V (H)) ∪ {u}.
The weight of a node u ∈ V (H), denoted by |S(u)| is then defined as the number of nodes of S(u).
Notice that S(u) denotes the set of all nodes v in the connected component containing u induced by
(V (G) \V (H))∪{u} and then, every shortest path in G from v to any node w ∈ V (H) goes through u.
In the following sections we consider G to be a ne for α > n and H ⊆ G, if it exists, a non-trivial
biconnected component of G, that is, a biconnected component of G of at least three distinct nodes.
Then we use the abbreviations dG, dH to refer to the diameter of G and the diameter of H, respectively,
and nH the size of H.
1.2 Historical overview
We now describe the progress around the central question of giving improved upper bounds on the
PoA of the network creation games introduced by Fabrikant et al. in [12].
First of all, let us explain briefly two key results that are used to obtain better upper bounds on
the PoA. The first is that the PoA for trees is at most 5 ([12]). The second one is that the PoA of
any ne graph is upper bounded by its diameter plus one unit ([9]). Using these two results it can be
shown that the PoA is constant for almost all values of the parameter α. Demaine et al. in [9] showed
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constant PoA for α = O(n1−δ) with δ ≥ 1logn by proving that the diameter of equilibria is constant
for the same range of α. In the view that the PoA is constant for a such a wide range of values of α,
Demaine et al. in [9] conjectured that the PoA is constant for any α. This is what we call the constant
PoA conjecture. More recently, Bilo` and Lenzner in [7] demonstrated constant PoA for α > 4n− 13 by
showing that every ne is a tree for the same range of α. For the remaining range Demaine et al. in [9]
determined that the PoA is upper bounded by 2O(
√
logn).
The other important conjecture, the tree conjecture, stated by Fabrikant et al. in [12], still remains
to be solved. The first version of the tree conjecture said that there exists a positive constant A such
that every ne is a tree for α > A. This was later refuted by Albers et al. in [3]. The reformulated tree
conjecture that is believed to be true is for the range α > n. In [20] the authors show an example of
a non-tree ne for the range α = n − 3 and then, we can deduce that the generalisation of the tree
conjecture for α > n cannot be extended to the range α > n(1 − δ) with δ > 0 any small enough
positive constant. Notice that the constant PoA conjecture and the tree conjecture are related in the
sense that if the tree conjecture was true, then we would obtain that the PoA is constant for the range
α > n as well.
Let us describe the progress around these two big conjectures considering first the case of large
values of α and after the case of small values of α.
For large values of α it has been shown constant PoA for the intervals α > n3/2 [17], α > 12n log n
[3], α > 273n [19], α > 65n [20], α > 17n [1] and α > 4n− 13 [7], by proving that every ne for each of
these ranges is a tree, that is, proving that the tree conjecture holds for the corresponding range of α.
The main approach to prove the result in [19,20,1] is to consider a biconnected (or 2-edge-connected
in [1]) component H from the ne network, and then to establish non-trivial upper and lower bounds
for the average degree of H, noted as deg(H). More specifically, it is shown that deg(H) ≤ f1(n, α) for
every α ≥ c1n and deg(H) ≥ f2(n, α) for every α ≥ c2n, with c1, c2 constants and f1(n, α), f2(n, α)
functions of n, α. From this it can be concluded that there cannot exist any biconnected component H
for any α in the set {α | f1(n, α) < f2(n, α) ∧ α ≥ max(c1, c2)n}, and thus every ne is a tree for this
range of α.
In [19,20], to prove the upper bound on the term deg(H) the authors basically consider a BFS tree
T rooted at a node u minimising the sum of distances in H and define a shopping vertex as a vertex
from H that has bought at least one edge of H but not of T . The authors show that every shopping
vertex has bought at most one extra edge and that the distance between two distinct shopping vertices
is lower bounded by a non-trivial quantity that depends on α and n. By combining these two properties
the authors can give an improved upper bound on deg(H) which is close to 2 from above when α is
large enough in comparison to n. On the other hand, to prove a lower bound on deg(H) the authors
show that in H there cannot exist too many nodes of degree 2 close together.
In [1], the authors use the same upper bound as the one in [20] for the term deg(H) but give an
improved lower bound better than the one from [20]. To show this lower bound we introduce the
concept of coordinates and 2-paths. For α > 4n, the authors prove that every minimal cycle is directed
and then use this result to show that there cannot exist long 2−paths.
In contrast, Bilo` and Lenzner in [7] consider a different approach. Instead of using the technique of
bounding the average degree, they introduce, for any non-trivial biconnected component H of a graph
G, the concepts of critical pair, strong critical pair, and then, show that every minimal cycle for the
corresponding range of α is directed. The authors play with these concepts in a clever way in order to
reach the conclusion.
In a very preliminary draft [2], we take another perspective and conclude that given  > 0 any
positive constant, the PoA is constant for α > n(1+ ). Specifically, in [2], we prove that if the diameter
of a ne graph is larger than a given positive constant, then the graph must be a tree. Such proposal
represents an interesting approach to the same problem but the calculations and the proofs are very
involved and hard to follow. In this work we present in a clear and elegant way the stronger result that,
for the same range of α, the size of any biconnected component of any non-tree ne is upper bounded
by a constant.
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For small values of α, among the most relevant results, it has been proven that the PoA is constant
for the intervals α = O(1) [12], α = O(
√
n) [3,17] and α = O(n1−δ) with δ ≥ 1/ log n [9].
The most powerful technique used in these papers is the one from Demaine et al. in [9]. They show
that the PoA is constant for α = O(n1−δ) with δ > 1/ log n, by studying a specific setting where some
disjoint balls of fixed radius are included inside a ball of bigger radius. Considering the deviation that
consists in buying the links to the centers of the smaller balls, the player performing such deviation
gets closer to a majority of the nodes by using these extra bought edges (if these balls are chosen
adequately). With this approach it can be shown that the size of the balls grows in a very specific way,
from which then it can be derived the upper bounds for the diameter of equilibria and thus for the
PoA.
1.3 Our contribution
Let us consider a weaker version of the tree conjecture that considers the existence of biconnected
components in a ne having some specific properties regarding their size.
Conjecture 1 (The biconnected component conjecture). For α > n, any biconnected component of a
non-tree ne graph has size at most a prefixed constant.
Let  > 0 be any positive constant. We show that the restricted version of this conjecture where
α > n(1 + ) is true (Section 5, Theorem 3). This result jointly with dG ≤ dH + 250 (Theorem 1,
Section 4) for α > n, whenever H exists, imply that dG is upper bounded by a prefixed constant, too.
Recall that, the diameter of any graph plus one unit is an upper bound on the PoA and the price of
anarchy for trees is constant. Hence, we can conclude that the PoA is constant for α > n(1 + ).
In order to show these results, we introduce a new kind of sets, the A sets, satisfying some interesting
properties and we adapt some well-known techniques and then, combine them together in a very
original way. Let us describe the main ideas of our approach:
– Inspired by the technique considered in [9] which is used to relate the diameter of G with the size
of G, we obtain an analogous relation between the diameter of H and the size of H (Section 3,
Proposition 4), that can be expressed as dH = 2
O(
√
lognH).
– We improve the best upper bound known on deg(H) (Section 5, Theorem 2). We show this crucial
result by using a different approach than the one used in the literature. We consider a node
u ∈ V (H) minimising the sum of distances and, instead of lower bounding the distance between
two shopping vertices, we introduce and study a natural kind of subsets, the A sets (Section
2). Each A set corresponds to a node v ∈ V (H) and a pair of edges e1, e2 where v ∈ V (H) and
e1, e2 ∈ E(H) are two links bought by v. The A sets play an important role when upper bounding
the cost difference of player v associated to the deviation of the same player that consists in
selling e1, e2 and buying a link to u (Section 2, Proposition 1 and Proposition 2). By counting the
cardinality of these A sets we show that the term deg(H) can be upper bounded by an expression
in which the terms n, α, nH , and dH appear (Section 2, Proposition 3). By using the relation
dH = 2
O(
√
lognH) we can refine the upper bound for the deg(H) even more. Subsequently, we
consider the technique used in [19,20,1], in which lower and upper bounds on the average degree
of H are combined to reach a contradiction whenever H exists, i.e. whenever G is a non-tree ne
graph.
2 An upper bound for deg(H) in terms of the size and the diameter of H
Remind that in all the sections we consider that G is a ne of a network creation game Γ = (V, α)
where α > n. If G is not a tree then we denote by H a maximal biconnected component of G.
In this section we give an intermediate upper bound for the term deg(H) that will be useful later
to derive the main conclusion of this paper.
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Let u ∈ V (H) be a prefixed node and suppose that we are given v ∈ V (H) and e1 = (v, v1), e2 =
(v, v2) two links bought by v. The A set of v, e1 = (v, v1), e2 = (v, v2), noted as Ae1,e2(v), is the subset
of nodes z ∈ V (G) such that every shortest path (in G) starting from z and reaching u goes through v
and the predecessor of v in any such path is either v1 or v2.
Therefore, notice that v 6∈ Ae1,e2(v) and the following remark always hold:
Remark 1. Let e1, e2, e
′
1, e
′
2 be four distinct edges such that e1, e2 are bought by v and e
′
1, e
′
2 are bought
by v′. If dG(u, v) = dG(u, v′) then the A set of v, e1, e2 and the A set of v′, e′1, e
′
2 are disjoint even if
v = v′.
Notice that the definition of the A sets depends on u ∈ V (H), a prefixed node. For the sake of
simplicity we do not include u in the notation of the A sets. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are stated
for any general u ∈ V (H) but in Corollary 1 we impose that u minimises the function DG(·) in H.
For any i = 1, 2, we define the Ai set of v, e1 = (v, v1), e2 = (v, v2), noted as A
i
e1,e2(v), the subset
of nodes z from Ae1,e2(v) for which there exists a shortest path (in G) starting from z and reaching u
such that goes through v and the predecessor of v in such path is vi.
With these definitions, Ae1,e2(v) = A
1
e1,e2(v)∪A2e1,e2(v) and Aie1,e2(v) = ∅ iff dG(u, vi) = dG(u, v)−1
or dG(u, vi) = dG(u, v). Furthermore, the subgraph induced by A
i
e1,e2(v) is connected whenever
Aie1,e2(v) 6= ∅.
Now, suppose that e1, e2 ∈ E(H) and think about the deviation of v that consists in deleting
ei for i = 1, 2 and buying a link to u. Let ∆C be the corresponding cost difference and define
crossings(X,Y ) for subsets of nodes X,Y ⊆ V (G) to be the set of edges xy with x ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
Then we derive formulae to upper bound ∆C in the two only possible complementary cases: (i)
crossings(A1e1,e2(v), A
2
e1,e2(v)) 6= ∅ and (ii) crossings(A1e1,e2(v), A2e1,e2(v)) = ∅.
In case (i), A1e1,e2(v), A
2
e1,e2(v) 6= ∅ so that the subgraphs induced by A1e1,e2(v), A2e1,e2(v) are both
connected. This trivially implies that the graph induced by Ae1,e2(v) = A
1
e1,e2(v)∪A2e1,e2(v) is connected
as well. Therefore, since H is biconnected and e1, e2 ∈ E(H) by hypothesis, there must exist at least
one connection distinct from e1, e2 joining Ae1,e2(v) with its complement. Taking this fact into the
account we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. Let us assume that crossings(A1e1,e2(v), A
2
e1,e2(v)) 6= ∅ and xy is any connection
distinct from e1, e2 between Ae1,e2(v) and its complement, with x ∈ Ae1,e2(v). Furthermore, let l be the
distance between v1, v2 in the subgraph induced by Ae1,e2(v). Then ∆C, the cost difference for player v
associated to the deviation of the same player that consists in deleting e1, e2 and buying a link to u,
satisfies the following inequality:
∆C ≤ −α+ n+DG(u)−DG(v) + (2dG(v, x) + l)|Ae1,e2(v)|
Proof. The term −α is clear because we are deleting the two edges e1, e2 and buying a link to u. Now
let us analyse the difference of the sum of distances in the deviated graph G′ vs the original graph. For
this purpose, suppose wlog that x ∈ A1e1,e2(v) and let z be any node from G. We distinguish two cases:
(A) If z 6∈ Ae1,e2(v) then:
(1) Starting at v, follow the connection vu.
(2) Follow a shortest path from u to z in the original graph.
In this case we have that:
dG′(v, z) ≤ 1 + dG(u, z)
(B) If z ∈ Ae1,e2(v) then there exists some i such that z ∈ Aie1,e2(v). Consider the following path
(see the figure below for clarifications):
(1) Starting at v, follow the connection vu, which corresponds to one unit distance.
(2) Follow a path from u to y contained in the complementary of Ae1,e2(v). Since y 6∈ Ae1,e2(v)
we have that dG(u, y) ≤ dG(u, v) + dG(v, x) + 1. Therefore, in this case we count at most dG(u, v) +
dG(v, x) + 1 unit distances.
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zv1
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v2
Ae1,e2(v)
A1e1,e2(v)
A2e1,e2(v)
x
y
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Fig. 1. The new path from z to v in the deviated graph G′
(3) Cross the connection yx, which corresponds to one unit distance.
(4) Go from x to v1 inside Ae1,e2(v) giving exactly dG(x, v)− 1 unit distances.
(5) Go from v1 to vi inside Ae1,e2(v) giving at most l unit distances.
(6) Go from vi to z inside Ae1,e2(v) giving exactly dG(v, z)− 1 unit distances.
In this case we have that:
dG′(v, z) ≤
(1)︷︸︸︷
1 +
(2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
dG(u, v) + dG(v, x) + 1 +
(3)︷︸︸︷
1 +
(4)︷ ︸︸ ︷
dG(x, v)− 1 +
(5)︷︸︸︷
l +
(6)︷ ︸︸ ︷
dG(v, z)− 1
=1 + dG(u, z) + (2dG(v, x) + l)
Combining the two inequalities we reach the conclusion:
∆C ≤ −α+
∑
z∈V (G)
(dG′(v, z)− dG(v, z)) ≤ −α+ n+DG(u)−DG(v) + (2dG(v, x) + l)|Ae1,e2(v)|

In case (ii), we assume that crossings(A1e1,e2(v), A
2
e1,e2(v)) = ∅. Since H is biconnected and
e1, e2 ∈ E(H) by hypothesis, for each i such that Aie1,e2(v) 6= ∅ there must exist at least one connection
distinct from ei joining A
i
e1,e2(v) with its complement. Taking this fact into the account we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2. Let us assume that crossings(A1e1,e2(v), A
2
e1,e2(v)) = ∅ and let I ⊆ {1, 2} be the
subset of indices i for which Aie1,e2(v) 6= ∅. Furthermore, suppose that for each i ∈ I, xiyi is any
connection distinct from ei between A
i
e1,e2(v) and its complement, with xi ∈ Aie1,e2(v). Then ∆C, the
cost difference of player v associated to the deviation of the same player that consists in deleting e1, e2
and buying a link to u, satisfies the following inequality:
∆C ≤ −α+ n+DG(u)−DG(v) + max(0, 2 max
i∈I
dG(v, xi))|Ae1,e2(v)|
Proof. The term −α is clear because we are deleting e1, e2 and buying a link to u. Now let us analyse
the difference of the sum of distances in the deviated graph G′ vs the original graph. To this purpose,
let z be any node from G. We distinguish two cases:
(A) If z 6∈ Ae1,e2(v) then:
(1) Starting at v, follow the connection vu.
(2) Follow a shortest path from u to z in the original graph.
In this case we have that:
dG′(v, z) ≤ 1 + dG(u, z)
(B) If z ∈ Ae1,e2(v) then there exists some i such that z ∈ Aie1,e2(v). Consider the following path:
(1) Starting at v, follow the connection vu, which corresponds to one unit distance.
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(2) Follow a path from u to y contained in the complementary of Ae1,e2(v). Since y 6∈ Ae1,e2(v)
we have that dG(u, y) ≤ dG(u, v) + dG(v, xi) + 1. Therefore, in this case we count at most dG(u, v) +
dG(v, xi) + 1 unit distances.
(3) Cross the connection yixi, which corresponds to one unit distance.
(4) Go from xi to vi giving exactly dG(xi, v)− 1 unit distances.
(5) Go from vi to z giving exactly dG(v, z)− 1 unit distances.
In this case we have that:
dG′(v, z) ≤
(1)︷︸︸︷
1 +
(2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
dG(u, v) + dG(v, x) + 1 +
(3)︷︸︸︷
1 +
(4)︷ ︸︸ ︷
dG(xi, v)− 1 +
(5)︷ ︸︸ ︷
dG(v, z)− 1
=1 + dG(u, z) + 2dG(v, xi)
Combining the two inequalities we reach the conclusion:
∆C ≤ −α+
∑
z∈V (G)
(dG′(v, z)−dG(v, z)) ≤ −α+n+DG(u)−DG(v)+max(0, 2 max
i∈I
dG(v, xi))|Ae1,e2(v)|

Now, notice the following simple fact:
Remark 2. If z1, z2 ∈ V (H) then any shortest path from z1 to z2 is contained in H. This is because
otherwise, using the definition of cut vertex, any such path would visit two times the same cut vertex
thus contradicting the definition of shortest path. Therefore, if z1, z2 ∈ V (H) then dG(z1, z2) =
dH(z1, z2) ≤ dH .
Combining the formulae from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 together with this last remark, we
can obtain a lower bound for the cardinality of any A set of v, e1, e2 when u satisfies a very specific
constraint:
Corollary 1. If u ∈ V (H) is such that DG(u) = minz∈V (H) {DG(z)}, then |Ae1,e2(v)| ≥ α−n4dH
Proof. Let us analyse the properties that are fulfilled for the distinct elements in this setting:
First, u minimises the sum of distances on V (H). Therefore, DG(u)−DG(v) ≤ 0 for any v ∈ V (H).
Now, let xy be any crossing between Ae1,e2(v) and its complement with x in Ae1,e2(v) and y in
the complementary of Ae1,e2(v). Consider also x
′, y′ be the nodes from V (H) such that x ∈ S(x′) and
y ∈ S(y′). If z ∈ V (H), then either S(z) is a subset of Ae1,e2(v), if z ∈ Ae1,e2(v), or S(z) is a subset
of the complementary of Ae1,e2(v) otherwise, by the definition of the A sets and by the definition
of cut vertex. Therefore, S(x′) is a subset of Ae1,e2(v) and S(y
′) is a subset of the complementary
of Ae1,e2(v). Furthermore, by the definition of biconnected component, any crossing or connection
between S(z1) and S(z2) with z1, z2 ∈ V (H) and z1 6= z2, if it exists, must definitely be z1z2. Therefore,
x = x′, y = y′ and as a result x, y ∈ V (H). Then by Remark 2, the distance from x to v is at most dH .
In a similar way, it can be deduced that if xiyi is any crossing between A
i
e1,e2(v) and its complement,
then xi, yi ∈ V (H) and therefore, the distance from xi to v is at most dH . As a conclusion, both
expressions dG(v, x) and dG(v, xi), appearing in the formulae from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2,
respectively, are at most dH .
Moreover, whenever e1, e2 ∈ E(H) and crossings(A1e1,e2(v), A2e1,e2(v)) 6= ∅, any shortest path
connecting v1 and v2 inside Ae1,e2(v) is contained in H and has length at most 2dH . This implies that
the expression l appearing in the formula from Proposition 1 is at most 2dH .
With all these results, we deduce that, the expressions multiplying |Ae1,e2(v)| in the rightmost term
of the two inequalities from Proposition 1 (2dG(v, x)+ l) and Proposition 2 (max(0, 2 maxi∈I dG(v, xi)))
can be upper bounded by 4dH .
Imposing that G is a ne then we obtain the conclusion.
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
Now we use this last formula to give an upper bound for the average degree of H. Recall that we
are working in the range α > n:
Proposition 3.
deg(H) ≤ 2 + 16dH(dH + 1)n
nH(α− n)
Proof. For any node v ∈ V (H) let Z(v) be any maximal set of distinct and mutually disjoint pairs
of edges from H bought by v. Let X be defined as the set of tuples ({e1, e2} , v) with v ∈ V (H) and
{e1, e2} a pair of edges from Z(v). Now define S =
∑
({e1,e2},v)∈X |Ae1,e2(v)|. On the one hand, using
Corollary 1:
S ≥ α− n
4dH
|X|
On the other hand, for each distance index i, let Si be the sum of the cardinalities of the A sets for
all the tuples ({e1, e2} , v) ∈ X with dG(u, v) = i. By Remark 1, Si ≤ n. Therefore:
|X|α− n
4dH
≤ S = S0 + ...+ SdH ≤ n(dH + 1)
Next, notice that there are exactly bdeg
+
H(v)
2 c pairs in Z(v) for each v considered. Furthermore,
bdeg
+
H(v)
2 c = deg+H(v)/2 if deg+H(v) is even and b
deg+H(v)
2 c = (deg+H(v)− 1)/2 otherwise. Hence:
|X| ≥
∑
v∈V (H)
deg+H(v)− 1
2
=
|E(H)| − |V (H)|
2
Finally:
deg(H) =
2|E(H)|
|V (H)| ≤ 2 +
4|X|
|V (H)| ≤ 2 +
16(dH + 1)ndH
nH(α− n)

3 The diameter of H vs the number of nodes of H
In this section we establish a relationship between the diameter and the number of the vertices of H
which allows us to refine the upper bound for the term deg(H) using the main result of the previous
subsection.
We start extending the technique introduced by Demaine et al in [9]. Instead of reasoning in
a general G, we focus our attention to the nodes from H reaching an analogous result. Since for
α > 4n− 13 every ne is a tree it is enough if we study the case α < 4n.
For any integer value k and u ∈ V (H) we define Nk,H(u) = {v ∈ V (H) | dG(u, v) ≤ k}, the set
of nodes from V (H) at distance at most k from u. With this definition in mind then Sk(u) =
∪v∈Nk,H(u)S(v) is the set of all nodes inside S(v) for all v ∈ V (H) at distance at most k from u. In
other words, Sk(u) is the set of all nodes z such that the first cut vertex that one finds when following
any shortest path from z to u is at distance at most k from u.
Furthermore, for any integer k we define mk = minu∈V (H) |Nk,H(u)|. That is, mk is the minimum
cardinality that any k-neighbourhood in H can have.
Lemma 1. Let H be a biconnected component of G. For any integer k ≥ 0, either there exists a node
u ∈ V (H) such that |S4k+1(u)| > n/2 or, otherwise, m5k+1 ≥ mkk/4.
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Proof. If there is a vertex u ∈ V (H) with |S4k+1(u)| > n/2, then the claim is obvious. Otherwise, for
every vertex u ∈ V (H), |S4k+1(u)| ≤ n/2. Let u be any node from V (H) minimising the cardinality of
the balls of radius 5k+1 intersected with V (H). That is, u is any node from V (H) with |N5k+1,H(u)| =
m5k+1. Let Z = {v1, ..., vl} be any maximal set of nodes from V (H) at distance 4k + 1 from u (in H)
with the property that every two distinct nodes vi, vj ∈ Z, we have that dG(vi, vj) ≥ 2k + 1 (see the
left picture from Figure 2 for a visual clarification).
Now, consider the deviation of u that consists in buying the links to every node from Z and let G′
be the new graph resulting from such deviation. Let z ∈ S(w) with w ∈ V (H) and dG(w, u) ≥ 4k + 1
and consider any shortest path (in H) from w to u. Let wpi be the node from any such shortest path
at distance 4k + 1 from u. By the maximality of Z there exists at least one node vw ∈ Z for which
dG(vw, wpi) ≤ 2k. The original distance between z and u is dG(z, u) = dG(z, w) + dG(w, u). In contrast,
the distance between z and u in G′ satisfies the following inequality (see the right picture from Figure
2 for a visual clarification):
dG′(z, u) ≤ 1 + dG(vw, wpi) + dG(wpi, w) + dG(w, z)
≤ 1 + 2k + (dG(u,w)− (4k + 1)) + dG(w, z) = −2k + dG(u,w) + dG(w, z)
v1
v2
vl
u
k
4k + 1
5k + 1
vw
u
k
4k + 1
5k + 1
wpi
w
Fig. 2. The setting of nodes from the proof (left) and the alternative path from w to u in the deviated graph
(right)
Therefore, dG(z, u)− dG′(z, u) ≥ 2k. Since we are assuming that |S4k+1(u)| ≤ n/2 then this means
that
∑
{v∈V (H)|dG(v,u)>4k+1} |S(v)| ≥ n/2, that is, the sum of the weights of the nodes from H at
distance strictly greater than 4k + 1 from u is greater than or equal n/2. Then ∆C, the cost difference
for u associated to such deviation, satisfies:
∆C ≤ lα− 2k
(n
2
)
≤ 4nl − kn
Since G is a ne then from this we conclude that l ≥ k/4.
Finally, notice that the distance between two nodes in Z is at least 2k + 1 implying that the
set of all the balls of radius k with centers at the nodes from Z are mutually disjoint. Therefore,
m5k+1 = |N5k+1,H(u)| ≥ lmk ≥ mkk/4.

Lemma 2. If r < dH/4− 4 then |Sr(u)| ≤ n/2 for every node u ∈ V (H).
Proof. Suppose the contrary and we reach a contradiction, that is, suppose that there exists some
u ∈ V (H) with |Sr(u)| > n/2 and r < dH/4− 4. Let t ∈ V (H) be any node at distance dH/2 from u,
which always exists. We consider the deviation of t that consists in buying a link to u and we define G′
to be the new graph resulting from such deviation. Let z ∈ Sr(u) with w ∈ V (H) such that z ∈ S(w).
The distance between t and w in G is at least dH/2 − r so the distance between t and z in G is at
9
least dH/2 − r + dG(w, z). In contrast, the distance between t and w in G′ is at most 1 + r, so the
distance between t and z in G′ is at most 1 + r + dG(w, z). Therefore:
dG(z, t)− dG′(z, t) ≥ dH/2− 2r − 1 > dH/2− 2(dH/4− 4)− 1 = 7
Then dG(z, t)−dG′(z, t) ≥ 8 and thus ∆C, the cost difference of t associated to such deviation, satisfies:
∆C ≤ α− 8|Sr(u)| ≤ 4n− 8|Sr(u)| < 4n− 8
2
n = 0
A contradiction with the fact that G is a ne.

Combining these results we are able to give an extension of the result from Demaine et al in [9]:
Proposition 4. dH < 5
√
2 log5 nH+5.
Proof. Consider the following sequence of numbers (ai)i≥0 defined in the following way:
(i) a0 = 21.
(ii) ai+1 = 5ai + 1 for i ≥ 0.
It is easy to check that ak = 21 · 5k + 5k−15−1 for any k ≥ 0 so that 22 · 5k > ak ≥ 21 · 5k. With this
definition and using the two previous results we reach the conclusion that whenever 4ai+ 1 < dH/4− 4,
then |S4ai+1(u)| ≤ n/2 for all u ∈ V (H), by Lemma 2, implying mai+1 ≥ mai ai4 , by Lemma 1. Iterating
the recurrence relation we can see that whenever i ≥ 0 and 4ai + 1 < dH/4− 4, then:
mai+1 ≥
aiai−1...a1a0
4i+1
ma0
Since a0 = 21 then ma0 ≥ 21. Therefore:
mai+1 ≥ 21
(
21
4
)i+1
5i+(i−1)+...+1+0 > 5i
2/2
Now, consider the value k such that 4ak + 1 < dH/4 − 4 ≤ 4ak+1 + 1. On the one hand, nH ≥
mak+1 > 5
k2/2 so this implies that k ≤√2 log5 nH . On the other hand, dH/4 ≤ 4ak+1+5 < 22 ·4 ·5k+1.
Therefore, dH < 5
k+5 ≤ 5
√
2 log5 nH+5, as we wanted to see.

4 The diameter of G vs the diameter of H.
In this section we establish a relationship between the diameter of G and the diameter of H when
α > n. Since for α > 4n− 13 every ne is a tree it is enough if we study the case n < α < 4n.
We show that in this case, the distance between any pair w, z ∈ V (G) where z ∈ S(w), is upper
bounded by 125 from where we can conclude that dG < dH + 250. To obtain these results we basically
exploit the fact that G is a ne graph together with key topological properties of biconnected components:
Proposition 5. Let w ∈ V (H) and z ∈ S(w) maximising the distance to w. Then dG(z, w) < 125.
Proof. Let Z be the subgraph of G induced by S(w) and W the subgraph of G induced by w
together with the set of nodes V (G) \ S(w). Then, define r = dG(z, w) = maxt∈V (Z) dG(w, t), s =
maxt∈V (W ) dG(w, t) (see the figure below for clarifications). With these definitions it is enough to show
that r < 125. Notice that, for instance, if S(w) = {w} then the result trivially holds.
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wW
sz r
Z
Fig. 3. The most important subsets, nodes and distances from the setting.
First, let us see that min(r, s) ≤ 8.
Let v any node maximising the distance to w in W and ∆C1 and ∆C2 the corresponding cost
differences of players z and v, respectively, associated to the deviations of the same players that consist
in buying a link to w. Then:
∆C1 ≤ α− |V (W )|(r − 1)
∆C2 ≤ α− |V (Z)|(s− 1)
Adding up the two inequalities and using that α < 4n:
∆C1 +∆C2 ≤ 2α− (min(r, s)− 1)(|V (Z)|+ |V (W )|) < 8n− (min(r, s)− 1)n
Since G is a ne graph then ∆C1 + ∆C2 ≥ 0 and from here we deduce that min(r, s) ≤ 8, as we
wanted to see.
If r ≤ 8 then we are done. Therefore we must address the case s ≤ 8.
Next, since H is a non-trivial biconnected component, there exist nodes t, t′ ∈ V (H) such that they
are adjacent in H, t has bought the link e = (t, t′) and one of the two following cases happen: either
(i) t is at distance 1 from w, t′ is at distance 1 or 2 from w or (ii) t′ is at distance 1 from w and t at
distance 2 from w (see the figure below for a clarification).
w
WZ
t
tt
′ Case (ii)
Case (i)
t′
t′
Fig. 4. An image depicting the setting for case (i) and case (ii).
In case (i) we deduce that |S(w)| = |V (Z)| ≤ n 4s−24s−1 ≤ n 3031 . This is because of the following
reasoning. Let ∆Cdelete be the corresponding cost difference of player t associated to the deviation
of the same player that consists in deleting the edge e. Since H is biconnected then there exists a
loop going through e and contained in H of length at most 4s+ 1. Notice that when deleting e, t only
increases the distances maybe to the nodes from V (W ) \ {w} but not to the nodes from V (Z) by at
most 4s− 1 distance units. Therefore:
∆Cdelete ≤ −α+ (4s− 1)(n− |V (Z)|) < −n+ (4s− 1)(n− |V (Z)|)
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Since G is a ne graph then ∆Cdelete ≥ 0 and from here, using the hypothesis s ≤ 8, we deduce the
conclusion:
|V (Z)| < −n+ n(4s− 1)
4s− 1 = n
4s− 2
4s− 1 ≤
30
31
n
In case (ii) we deduce that |S(w)| = |V (Z)| ≤ n/2. This is because of the following reasoning. Let
∆Cswap be the corresponding cost difference of player t associated to the deviation of the same player
that consists in swapping the edge e for the link (t, w). Notice that when performing such swap, t only
increases the distances maybe to the nodes from V (W ) \ {w} but strictly decreases for sure, one unit
distance to all the nodes from V (Z). Therefore:
∆Cswap ≤ −|V (Z)|+ (n− |V (Z)|) ≤ n− 2|V (Z)|
Since G is a ne graph then ∆Cswap ≥ 0 and from here we deduce the conclusion |V (Z)| ≤ n/2.
Hence, we have obtained that either |S(w)| ≤ 3031n, in case (i), or |S(w)| ≤ n2 , in case (ii).
Finally, consider the deviation of z that consists in buying the link to w. Then the corresponding
cost difference ∆Cbuy satisfies the following inequality:
∆Cbuy ≤ α− (r − 1)(n− |S(w)|) < 4n− (r − 1)(n− |S(w)|)
Since G is a ne graph, then ∆Cbuy ≥ 0 so that we conclude that r < 4nn−|S(w)| + 1. Using this
property we conclude that r < 125 in case (i) and r ≤ 8 in case (ii), so we are done.

As a consequence:
Theorem 1. dG < dH + 250.
5 Combining the results
Finally, in this section we combine the distinct results obtained so far to prove the main conclusion.
On the one hand, combining Proposition 3 with Proposition 4 we reach the following result for the
average degree of H:
Theorem 2.
deg(H) < 2 +
16n
α− n
52
√
2 log5 nH+10
nH
On the other hand, recall that from Lemma 4 and Lemma 2 from [19] and [20], respectively, the
general lower bound deg(H) ≥ 2 + 116 that works for any α can be obtained.
With these results in mind we are now ready to prove the following strong result:
Theorem 3. Let  > 0 be any positive constant and α > n(1 + ). There exists a constant K such
that every biconnected component H from any non-tree Nash equilibrium G has size at most K.
Proof. Let G be any non-tree ne graph. Then there exists at least one biconnected component H. By
Theorem 2 when α > n(1+ ) we have that deg(H) < 2+ 16
52
√
2 log5 nH+10
nH
. On the other hand, we know
that for any α, deg(H) ≥ 2 + 116 . Then this implies that there exists a constant K upper bounding
the size of H, otherwise we would obtain a contradiction comparing the asymptotic behaviour of the
upper and lower bounds obtained for deg(H) in terms of nH .

In other words, the biconnected component conjecture holds for α > n(1 + ).
Furthermore, recall that it is well-known that the diameter of any graph plus one unit is an upper
bound for the PoA and the PoA for trees is constant. Therefore, we conclude that:
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Theorem 4. Let  > 0 be any positive constant. The price of anarchy is constant for α > n(1 + ).
Proof. LetG be a ne. IfG is a tree we are done, because the PoA for trees is at most 5. Therefore to prove
the result consider that G is a non-tree configuration. Then, G has at least one non-trivial biconnected
component H. On the one hand, by Theorem 3, there exists a constant K that upper bounds the size
of H. This implies that dH ≤ nH ≤ K. On the other hand, by Theorem 1, dG ≤ dH + 250. In this
way, dG ≤ K + 250 and since K + 250 is a constant, then the conclusion follows because the PoA is
upper bounded by the diameter plus one unit.

6 The conclusions
The most relevant contribution we have made in this article is to show that the price of anarchy is
constant for α > n(1+). We have not been able to prove the tree conjecture for α > n by showing that
there cannot exist any non-trivial biconnected component H for the same range of α. Instead, we have
proved that for α > n(1 + ), if H exists, then it has a constant number of nodes. This property implies
constant PoA for the same range of α. The technique we have used relies mostly on the improved upper
bound on the term deg(H) for α > n. However, as in [19,20], our refined upper bound still depends
on the term n/(α− n), that tends to infinity when α approaches n from above. This makes us think
that either our technique can be improved even more to obtain the conclusion that the tree conjecture
claims or it might be that there exist some non-tree equilibria when α approaches n from above.
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